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HELPING TO HARM?l
Background2
Andrew: Can I tell you some'ing real private?
Ain't never told no one before ... people who
knew for sure ... , they'se dead. .. all
dead but me ...
Sylvie: Anything you tell me is strictly between
us. When I write about people who talk to me
about AIDS, I make sure their own mother
wouldn't know them.
I feel safe, yet know I shouldn't: this is a
'squatter' basement apartment in an abandoned
building in a part of an inner city few people
choose to visit in daylight. I have run from one
interview to another for 20 hours, eating fast
food at the wheel. No one knows where I am -
in part because they would fuss. I recall the
police officer's comment: "your body might
never be found." It is roughly 3:00 a.moo
Andrew mainlined cocaine twice in five hours:
his is a decade-long habit, and he is at least as
lucid as I am.
Andrew: This could really blow big time ...
When Ted said he could really talk to you, I
figured it was all shit ... I don't trust white
][][][][][][][1 ][][][][][][][
folk ... but it's like you ain't shocked by
nothing, and this thing really bothers me..
[Andrew cries softly].
I know that I hold his unbelievably dirty hand
because he is vulnerable, which, to my mind,
entitles him to sympathetic understanding.
Fleetingly, I realize that I identify with his
sorrow. The first five hours, sitting on this
filthy floor, with this very rough looking gentle
man and a few thousand cockroaches, were a
test: now comes what may be Andrew's
deathbed confession.
Andrew: I did do it on purpose, like ...
As I settle in for the long haul, I know I am
hearing words never meant to be spoken ... and
I know I will not reveal them before Andrew's
death. I never owned his words. They are not
mine to give. I add my confidante role as I shift
my weight on a moldy couch cushion over bare
cement. As the pillow spills its guts, so does
Andrew.
I thank my intensity of listening: however
exhausted I may be, I can somehow replay
hours of interviews in my head, adding tone and
][][][][][][][ 2 ][][][][][][][
wardrobe and decor and body language. I
conceptualize this ability as empathic focus:
nothing matters but the emotions behind the
eyes, the tones and sensations behind the words!
Most of all, my commitment is to the role of
privileged listener (Siegel, 1987): it hinges on
what is most precious: Andrew's and my shared
humanity.
I could not leave this very sick, lonely man. I
recall how, for many colleagues, this represents
the worst possible option. Choosing to hear but
not to tell is, to their minds, 'bad science.'
It is the only ethical science I know to do.
Research, by definition, challenges our definition
of the known. Truly rewarding research may
even allow epiphanies - glimpses so far into the
unknown, so powerfully absorbing, that we have
little sense of their interpretive parameters
(Denzin, 1988). As social scientists adopt
research areas traditionally reserved for and
guarded by medical or legal practitioners,
sociological praxis increasingly presents very
real dilemmas. Fear of personal and
professional consequences fuels defensive
postures historically associated with those
][][][][][][][ 3 ][][][][][][][
professions. This includes discussions about
"What to do before and after a subpoena on data
arrives" (Knerr, 1982), and many of us, myself
included, carry hefty professional liability
coverage.
Unfortunately, fears and defensiveness can - and
do - create a backlash against reciprocal
relationships with vulnerable respondents.
Similarly, social scientists are burying
themselves in data dissociated from real persons.
This resembles the way in which physicians
prescribing every known test 'just in case' often
lose contact with the humanity of the patient. In
both cases, detachment stems partly from the
very defensiveness mandated by procedurally
dehumanizing treatment.
My particular concern is the failure of
sociologists to recognize or acknowledge the
unavoidable link between the power dimension
intrinsic to the research enterprise and
consequent obligations toward respondents
(Bartlett, 1991). Effective integration of ethics
requires forethought: this allows anticipating
management both of the research process and of
subsequent data. Sometimes, data can range
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from behavior the researcher labels 'odd, '
'disgusting' or 'perverse, ' to respondents
admitting willfully inflicting harm to themselves
or others. Researcher and respondent safety,
researcher integrity qua person and qua scientist
and, ultimately, the future of the profession,
depend on careful, ongoing development and
ready deployment of an 'ethical voice.' I define
this attribute as 'the mature implementation of
choice and actions despite the constraints of
oppreSSlOn. Ethical VOlce includes the
affirmation of moral agency, the valuing of
choice among alternatives, and the conception of
self as committed to making a difference through
affirmative choices.' As Hoagland suggests,
II [m]oral agents are autokoenonous beings"
(1988, p. 231).
I fear that dissociative segmentation foments a
belief in a professional "protoself' (Gagnon,
1992: p. 224) which allows for conduct deemed
inappropriate in other contexts but justified by
the presence of a unique, private, professionally
endorsed source of meaning. This protoself,
imbued with individualist autonomy, allows
sociologists to allow themselves exemptions.
They ignore social embedded ness as a necessary
][][][][][][][5 ][][][][][
component of justice. Rawls argues that any
just system of necessity includes equality of
liberty, and a restructuring of social and
economic inequalities. This actively
compensates most those who are neediest. Thus,
justice in the Ralwsian sense is intrinsically
social. To my mind, an orphaned, disabled,
unemployed, drug-addicted, homeless minority
HIV -positive man experienci ng the early
manifestations of full-blown AIDS is far needier
than an assistant professor of sociology, albeit
untenured! Unfortunately, not every scale is so
obviously tipped, not every researcher cares to
see if it is, and not everyone who sees that it is
feels a responsibility to do anything about it!
This paper focuses on the ethical complexities of
professional decision-making when research
findings concern vulnerable populations.
Specifically, I want to address situations when
publication or presentation may clearly inflict
harm to project participants or the population to
which they belong (Oakley, 1981). Like every
researcher, I bring a particular perspective to the
question. I have sat at deathbeds holding
people's hands when they thought they would
die; lain on hospital beds holding adults dying
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of AIDS and begging for hugs denied them
since the diagnosis, and sat overnight with
people talking their fears away. I cannot
dismiss those who honor me with their stories.
My perspective is therefore that of someone
neither seeking nor pretending 'objectivity.' It
is the standpoint of someone who cares deeply
about the pain HIV/AIDS brings all those it
touches3•
As a result, my fieldwork starts from two
absolutes. First is a conviction that, depending
as we do on the goodwill of respondents, we
owe them preeminent concern. Secondly, I
recognize that our presentation of self
encourages the most vulnerable to 'let us in.'
Therefore, I know that the notion of 'informed
consent' is at best glorified, and, at worst,
wilfully negligent. To my mind, 'consent' is a
much-abused concept. .. which we use as the
operational definition of respondent autonomy.
I argue that unless respondents are deliberately
and fully informed as to the political risks of
participation, they have not consented to such
risk.
I contend that neither profession nor institution
][][][][][][][7 ][][][][][][][
has sufficient moral authority to mandate the
release of data given by respondents, when those
respondents lack the access or the training to
understand the analytic context eventually
framing those data. Using evidence from my
own research among Persons with HIV/AIDS, I
suggest, and offer reasons why, researchers
aware of significant possible risks to the
respondents or their populations carry full moral
responsibility for protecting them from the
consequences of the very process of research.
Sociology as Apostle of the Status Quo: An
ethical embarrassment?
Researchers whose respondents are not self-
evidently needy could become alert to ethical
concerns because of the weight of the 'moral
errors' which mar our disciplinary landscape.
The history of the social sciences is strewn with
research projects that have inspired heated
debates: the Wichita Study, the Milgram
experiment, and Project Camelot are mere
background to more recent debacles. Ready-
made excuses - "this could never happen again"
"think of all we would yet have to learn without
Milgram" - must make way to realism: the
urgency of situating our work within a
][][][][][][][ 8 ][][][][][][][
thoughtfully articulated ethical perspective
(Noddings, 1984). Unfortunately, careful
contemplation is increasingly giving way to the
pressures of doing the work. When universities
promote the mass production of the lowest
publishable units ('LPU'S')4, individual faculty
members are torn between irreconcilable
loyalties.
Specifically, I fear the ease with which ethical
considerations are set aside (Tourigny, 1992).
The current academic climate promotes a
gradual but steady erosion of awareness of the
immense debt we owe those whose time we
appropriate 'for the benefit of science' (Savage,
1992). We are too busy hoping that HSIRB
reviewers will ask few questions, that response
rates will remain acceptable, and that journal
editors will accept manuscripts quickly, to think
very much about the people whose lives we
write about.
Yet, the definition of 'sociology' implies far
broader responsibilities than the simple gathering
of data for publication (Zeitlin, 1984). As we
branch out into ever-more-complex areas, we
need growing sensitivity to the breadth and
][] [][][] [] [][ 9 ][] [][][] [][] [
depth of concerns required by our social
mandate. Doing so effectively mean starting
long before circumstances require it.
When I first witnessed physician-assisted
suicides over a decade ago, in a jurisdiction
explicitly banning them, I was grateful for my
training. I had been required to reflect on the
implications of events such as these for my own
professional decision-maki ng.
Training into forethought helped ensure my
ethical and moral sense of well-being. When
the occasion arose, I stopped a potentially fatal
'medical accident.' I knew I would ... and I
knew I could live with the results. I had spent
time - and filled notebooks - analyzing the
distinctions between morality and legality, and
between individuality and 'universal precepts.'
I still fill those notebooks: my greatest debt
accrues to the respondent whose stories - each
more troubling than the last - keep me alert.
No doubt, professional expectations that we
publish hurriedly, certainly without ever
'suppressing findings' (Who has the luxury?)
stem in part from a profound and eminently
defensible commitment to academic freedom.
][][][][][][][ 10 ][][][][][][][
Paradoxically, however, this very commitment to
the freedom of researchers may spawn rules
facilitating disdain for respondents' autonomy as
persons. In given sociohistorical and
sociopolitical contexts, the release of
controversial findings may fuel policies
researchers know carry a high probability of
causing significant harm to the population
studied, if not to the individual respondents
themselves.
There are obvious ideological frames to these
arguments. However, I want to present tangible
cases before clarifying my own theoretical
commitments. Only careful articulation of
situational perspective can help identify ethical
commonalities. These, in
tum, may enable us to transcend methodologies
and political climate!
SOME SAMPLE DILEMMAS
The nature of my inquiries into the management
of HIV/AIDS unavoidably leads to discussions
about coping with daily life - and with the dying
process. This, in turn, frequently opens detailed
formulations of past behavior or existing plans
to which respondents are irreversibly committed.
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The most dramatic challenges of research with
Persons diagnosed with HIV/AIDS involve
dealing with the social consequences of the
stigma that remains attached to respondents.
Health care providers with a profound
commitment to their patients face difficult
decisions, because HIV/AIDS-related care
presents a variety of challenges. They do,
however, operate within a context recognizing
that HIV/AIDS poses a full spectrum of new
challenges.
Social scientists - and sociologists in particular -
have used traditional arguments in favor of
'objectivity,' adopted and integrated within the
professional culture when positivism was
defined as an aproblematic achievement.
Therefore, stringent rules about' non suppression
of data' were devised ... when 'data' meant
'survey responses,' and deleting identifiers
ensured anonymity.
As an ethnographer employed by a public
university and working among
socioeconomically marginalized inner-city
minority persons with HIV /AIDS and their loved
ones, I leave paper trails. Anyone interested in
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the specifics of my research needs only to obtain
copies of my Human Subjects Institutional
Review Board clearance to know precisely the
names of the clinics and of the physicians with
whom I work. From there, identifying persons
who have consented to meet with me becomes
a simple matter of verifying with staff at each
institution (also public).
As a result, I confront painful decisions about
whether to present findings, and if so when, how
and to whom. My profession informs me that I
have no right to make these distinctions: since I
cannot know with absolute certainty that
respondents would be prosecuted or that law
enforcement would subpoena my records
identifying individual respondents (documents I
keep outside the U.S. for that very reason), my
'job' is presumably to report all findings
promptly, without regard to the political climate
or the consequences for respondents.
The legal as well as the emotional and ethical
dimensions of the findings heighten the
complexity of the situation. The following
examples have occurred in settings with which
I have no current association, at the invitation of
][][][][][][][ 13 ][][][][][][][
participants who included me because they
understood my commitment to understanding the
specifics of coping with HIV/AIDS.
"Doctors Death": Suicide, Murder, or Death
with Dignity?
The current debate about Dr. Kevorkian's
decision to ease patients' attainment of a death
they define as timely seems to suggest that his
behavior is unique. In fact, the only
extraordinary feature of his behavior is his
willingness to be open and public about his
'death machine,' thus challenging the legislature
of the state of Michigan to acknowledge that
technology enabling physicians to keep patients
alive indefinitely may be conflicting with the
well-being of those patients5•
Facilitating death - even at the request of a
competent adult suffering a life-threatening
illness - is nonetheless currently illegal in most
U.S. jurisdictions. While many health care
providers disagree with the law, few are ready to
throw their careers into the self-sacrificial pyre
of public opinion. This is not to say that they
do not act on their convictions. Instead, the
process of easing patient death is cloaked in
][][][][][][][ 14 ][][][][][][][
mystery and fear.
Because patient populations - and gay men in
particular - have developed a strong sense of
community, practitioners willing to help patients
become known:
My family is visiting for [a
national holiday] . .. That is all
I have left to do ... My lover
is dead, I am blind and am
starting to lose my memory ...
[My lover] lost his mind before
he died. .. I hurt all the time.
.. {Dr. Xl will help ... I've
been there several times when
[(s)he] helped other people, and
they did not hurt ... not like
the others, who scream and cry
and plead until their bodies
finally give out . .. I am so
grateful to {Dr. Xl for caring
enough not to let some Board of
healthy doctors condemn me to
living out to the last breath ...
who knows how much longer.
Please be careful with this
information . . . nothing must
stop {Dr. Xl's work. If you
don't believe me, ask some
others who are not so sick yet. .
Several other people's stories confirm {John's}
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own preparations for death:
I met with [Dr. Xl today for the
first time ... ; I had decided to
kill myself yesterday, after I saw
someone I used to know ... he
has a bunch of degrees and he
used to be so sharp, and now all
he knows is pain. .. Ain't no
way I'se going through this. My
sister-in-law spent the night
holding me, so I wouldn't do
anything ... and my friends
called [Dr. Xl. As long as I
know that someone is ready to
help me die when the time comes
that my self-dignity is gone, then
I can go on and maybe do some
good. If anybody stops [Dr. Xl,
I'll do myself in, though, in a
minute . .. Too many people
wait too long and all they'se got
is pain and they can't do it no
more because their mind's gone,
or their bodies won't let 'em.
Not me, not ever, no ma'am ...
Under these circumstances, at what risk do I
place others who are choosing to stay alive, to
educate and enlighten others about HIV /AIDS,
if because of my work, ancillary health care
workers or law enforcement personnel tighten
their inquiry into 'timely deaths?' Given that
these clinicians have examined their own ethical
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stance and decided to act, at what social cost do
I let them be identified?
"Who'se gonnafeed my kids?"
[Rose] is a stunning twenty-two year old
woman; she looks healthy, well-groomed ...
not at all the popular vision of a Person with
AIDS. She used to have a 'respectable job,'
until her husband left her. A few months later,
she had a visit at work:
His woman came by, screaming
at me ... I couldn't even make
out what she was saying at first,
accusing me of trying to kill her.
I thought it was almost funny -
she takes my husband when he
has three kids under the age of
eighteen months, and she says I
try to kill her. Then my
blood froze. She was yelling
over and over "You done give
him AIDS and he's given it to
me." Well, that was the end of
my job and it was my diagnosis
. .. I had nowhere to go, my
parents have no money -- they'll
help sit the kids, but they can't
feed us or nothing. I hit the
skids ..., I guess I was
drunk the tirst time this guy
rented a hotel room. It was
fancy, like we used to go to hack
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when I wasn't alone with the
twins and the baby. I remember
thinking while he was doing it to
me "how's the rent gonna get
paid?" Then, he left me three
hundred dollars ..
I ain't gonna say I'm proud of
what I do, but shit, at least it's
honest work. If folks care so
much, maybe they can change the
laws so I qualify for benefits.
I'se got AIDS now, but not the
right kind to qualify for the full
benefits. My mother just
paralyzed, so when I die ... I'm
trying to leave something for the
kids ...
Condoms? Sure, I carry them.
Most guys ain't interested,
though. They gotta know the
percent of us who've got the
virus, and they pay extra not to
use a condom. Who'se crazy
here? .. My biggest fear is
getting arrested, because I'll be
quarantined. I don't "spread it on
purpose," but I've got enough to
do to care for me and my kids.
So that's my shtick ... you
ain't gonna turn me in, are you?
If I did, who would care for her children, two of
whom are HIV-positive?
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Analytic Comments: Seeking guidance
While federal regulations require mechanisms
for institutional management of ethical concerns
(Office for Scientific Integrity, National
Institutes of Health; etc.,) each profession
remains free to exercise its own judgment over
research procedures, "allowing for exceptions to
[its own] ethical standards if .. seem[ingly]
justified by the uniqueness of the situation"
(Lowman & Soule in Kimmel, 1981, p. 63).
While sociology can set realistic standards,
sociologists interpret them without much regard
for respondent welfare. The motivations seem
to lie in allowing themselves the built-in
flexibility to streamline exceptions. The
profession has always challenged its members to
gain access to governments and power brokers,
and sought to equilibrate the relationship by
making allowances for work done under
conditions of disempowerment. Armed for
combat with the powerful, sociologists may be
harming the vulnerable.
Evidence of the cultural grounding of
professional mores is irrefutable. The British
Sociological Association harks back to traditions
of noblesse oblige, with its call to
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accountability:
Sociologists should be aware that
they have some responsibility
with regard to any use to which
the results of their research may
be put . . . They have the
responsibility to consider the
effects of their research upon
further research. Sociologists
have a particular responsibility
for considering the possible
application of research findings
since this is in itself a
sociological problem, being
concerned with the prevention of
the misuse of research results
(1982; my emphasis).
The American Sociological Association also
admits that research may involve significant
risks and that respondents need protection:
B.7. Confidential information
provided by research participants
must be treated as such by
sociologists, even when this
information enjoys no legal
protection or privilege and legal
force is applied ... (1989; my
emphasis).
However, a preliminary clause stipulates clearly
that:
A.4. In presenting their work,
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sociologists are obligated to
report their findings fully
When work is presented, they
are obligated to report their
findings fully and without
omission of significant data. .
.(1989; my emphasis).
Resolution to this potentially radical
contradiction is a bit facile. A colleague
involved in disciplinary ethics suggests most
forcibly:
This is intended to give you
support once you have been
asked by the law to tum over
your respondent code lists. It
absolutely does not mean you can
suppress any data either in
publication or presentation. You
must analyze and present all you
find. You cannot anticipate law
enforcement reactions, so you
should not try . .. You must
always remember those are not
your decisions(!) (Emphasis in
the tone of voice of the
informant!)
Further evidence of disciplinary self-absorption
appears in the emphasis and tone of suggestions
written for, marketed to, and well-received by
][] [][][][] [][ 21 ][][][] [][][][
American" ... Students and Internal Review
Boards" as "helpful advice:"6
The advantages of . . . openness
and cordiality are enormous ...
Sensitivity and willingness to
accommodate [subjects' and
gatekeepers'] interests,
however inconvenient for the
researcher, payoff ill the long
rUIl. Insensitivity ... has often
resulted in a researcher being
asked to leave the field before
the project is completed (Sieber,
1992, p. 39, my emphasis).
Nowhere is there mention of the inhumanity of
insensitive conduct in research of the
inappropriate nature of any behavior one would
find objectionable if subjected to it, particularly
in the context of research! These
recommendations do not warn against harm to
respondent, but rather rai I agai nst the potential
inconveniences of respondent self-empowerment
as a response to undue pressure by
sociologists!?
Sieber suggests further that "Scientific
knowledge is a most appropriate benefit ... in
return for research participation. Unfortunately,
researchers often promise to give subjects the
][][][][][][][ 22 ][][][][][][][
results of their study" (Sieber, 1992, p. 101; my
emphasis). This disingenuous lack of distinction
between the purported 'scientific knowledge'
derived by respondents and the benefits accruing
to the career of a social scientist is an affront to
the powerless.
Social scientists are invited to find comfort in
the knowledge that 'subjects' are content with
knowing that we do our jobs, get merit raises,
tenure and promotion, and the sense that they
have done their best by allowing strangers
insights into their lives. It appears, from that
perspective, that they should not expect to ever
discover what we say about them, unless they
learn the inner workings of academic journals
and the libraries housing them!
No doubt, professional expectations that we
publish hurriedly, certainly without ever
'suppressing findings' (Who has the luxury?)
stem in part from a profound and eminently
defensible commitment to academic freedom.
Paradoxically, however, this very commitment to
the freedom of researchers may spawn rules
facilitating disdain for respondents' autonomy as
persons. In given sociohistorical and
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sociopolitical contexts, the release of
controversial findings may fuel policies
researchers know carry a high probability of
causing significant harm to the population
studied, if not to individual respondents.
Among the reasons for setti ng such
considerations aside are the enormous potential
professional costs to the researcher. For
example, the entire data set which provided the
preamble to this article remained intentionally
unaddressed for months. I waited until after the
U.S. presidential election, in the hope that the
Administration would acquire a newfound
sensitivity to key HIV /AIDS-pertinent issues.
Should that occur, I expected that findings
resulting from that research would be less likely
to fuel further oppressive, restrictive, arcane
policies meant to impress the 'Moral Majority.'
The data from the interview itself will not be
published during the respondent's lifetime,
unless dramatic changes in law ensure his safety
from prosecution.
These decisions are grounded in theoretical
assumptions which underlie my thinking.
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Theoretical Assumptions
Although the label of 'applied' social science
seems to allow an ever-greater multitude of
theoretically disembodied publications,
epistemological concerns about truth and
authenticity [ought to] precede data collections.
Such foundational components of disciplinarity
draw in part from ethics, but also from the
theoretical underpinnings of one's work. For
Symbolic Interactionists, the most fundamental
divergence between the Chicago and the Iowa
schools remains the methodological implications
of the interminable opposition between
'humanistic' and 'scientific' viewpoints (Kuhn,
1964). Blumer argues for a distinctive
methodology in the study of human beings,
while Kuhn urges the recognition of com-
monality of method in all scientific disciplines.
Blumer thus seeks to make modern man intel-
ligible, an idiographic function. This is contrary
to Kuhn's position, which promotes the search
for universal predictions of social conduct - a
nomothetic function some critics view as an
unrealistic endeavor (Meltzer & Petras, 1970).
My own commitment to the Chicago school
rests largely on its allowing the explicit
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integration of theory and ethics. The articulation
of one's understanding of truth is contingent
upon researcher self-awareness not only qua
researcher, but also qua fellow person.
Particularly convincing arguments urging
recognition of the ethical requirements of
interaction reside in feminist scholarship, which
offers transformational or emancipatory power
resting upon feminist epistemology. This details
the difficulties inherent to the dissociative
processes of so-called objective research.
Jaggar points out that perspective is necessarily
determined by standpoint, which she defines as
"a position in society from which certain
features of reality come into prominence and
from which others are obscured" (1983, p. 382).
This argument should carry weight for
positivists, since it is both based upon and
generalizable to the natural sciences. The
widespread acceptance of the post-crisis stage in
physics - residing in its admission of the
relativity of traditional definitions of 'truth' -
ought to grant the notion of 'standpoint' or
'perspective' increasing acceptability among
social scientists. In physics, the current
popularity of conformity and chaos theories -
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offering two sides of the same coin - highlights
the fluidity of even the corporeal world.
Physics, as a maturing science, now admits that
everything is amorphous and distinctions are
merely perceptual foils easing human
functioning in an indefinitely complex universe.
Establishing differences is the human way of
managing despite an acute shortage of the
synapses needed to take in the 'true' (read
'objective') nature of being. Physical sciences
now admit that 80 percent of the universe's
mass is constituted of 'dark matter' (thus named
because it remains neither defined nor
understood). As humans studying humans,
" .. [we] remember and cogitate
about what was or is relevant or
convenient to our own feelings.
Our opponents' views differ ...
not because [they] are any less
true, but because their 10 percent
of perception concentrates on
different things and places them
in a di fferent context . .. It is
quite possible that viewpoint is
all there is" (Callahan, 1993:14).
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Standpoint highlights the need for awareness of
and consciousness about our social location and
its relationship to our lived experience. From
that recognition stems awareness of the
different realities coexisting within one
experiential context. Perceptual relativism also
emphasizes individuals' di fferent relationships to
experience, as reflections of their sociopolitical
and psychosocial standpoints in that experience:
The challenge to social scientists
for a redefinition of the basic
problem has been raised in terms
of the "colonial analogy." It has
been argued that the relationship
between the researcher and his
subjects, by definition, resembles
that of the oppressor and the
oppressed. [In both cases, the
oppressor] defines the problem,
the nature of the research, and ..
the quality of interaction
between him and his subjects.
This ... neo-colonialism ...
prevents most social researchers
from being able accurately to
observe and analyze ... life and
culture and the impact [of]
oppression. . .. The basic
concepts and tools of white
Western society are permeated by
this partiality to the conceptual
framework of the oppressor"
(Ladner, 1987, p. 77; author's
emphasis).
Even when both are physicians who historically
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perceived clinical reality in much the same way,
the person with HIV/AIDS and her physician,
however 'objective' both try to be, necessarily
live shared encounters differently. Their
perspectives vary, by virtue of their differing
social, economic, political, emotional, personal,
interactional and experiential standpoints
concerning the diagnosis. Adding a social
scientist to the equation only complicates
matters: we have yet one (and potentially
several) other standpoints: theoretical,
experiential, emotional, perceptual, gender-,
race-, culture-, age- and health-based 'angles,'
(to name a few) each of which subtly but
definitely alter perspectives.
Because sociologists as members of a profession
have ignored standpoint, we lack insight into
how experiential and perceptual differences in
general alter perceptions in fundamental ways
transcending individual awareness. Thus, we
know little concerning how they permeate our
reflexive commentaries as researchers, and
'theirs' as respondents. Only by acknowledging
'standpoint' can we underscore the trouhlesome
dimensions of several assumptions underlying
'objectivity': the interchangeahility of data
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sources, the scientific detachment of researchers,
and the intrinsically problem-denying
dimensions of empirical analysis, among others.
No doubt, standpoint perspective carried to its
logical extreme has problematic consequences
similar to those of extreme skeptical
postmodernism: ".. the implication. .. is that
the greater the oppression, the broader or more
inclusive one's potential knowledge. . . . a
conclusion that few scholars can [endorse]"
(McCarl Nielsen, 1992, p. 25). That extreme,
however, is not necessary to the empirical
applications of 'standpoint.' Even while
acknowledged theoretically, standpoint need not
interfere with its application to understanding
individuality.
Paraphrasing Sandra Harding's argument about
feminist scholarship, issues of overt ambiguity
and ambivalence in our theorizing and
traditional notions of 'good theory' should
remain frustratingly unresolvable, because both
have a great deal to offer future theories and
practices (1987). I retain the notion of
standpoint - ambiguous though it may be - as an
acknowledgement of the individual's specific
social and interactionarplace within the various
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power dimensions relevant to an empirical
enquiry. I also stress how standpoint applies to
the researcher as well as the respondent. As a
medical social-psychologist involved in
academic and community AIDS-related
activities, I depend on formal support through
the academic institution where I work -
evidenced by the grant which sponsored the
research which, in turn, facilitated the
articulation of these ideas. I also depend on the
host institution(s) facilitating research, several
community agencies, professional societies,
health care providers, and much of the apparatus
of social control attendant to contemporary inner
city life. Most of all, I depend in many ways
upon the kindness, the openhearted ness and the
willingness to trust that respondents have
invested in our relationship.
Therefore, I stand at a particular juncture, which
unavoidably influences not only the ways in
which I interact while conducting research, but
also the very facts I count as data. .. and those
of which I remain unaware. That I follow up an
'admission' of a particular behavior with "would
you want to tell me more?" rather than with
"could we now turn to your other experiences.
· ." stems from how I define what is important.
It also specifies what I know! I rely on
intellectual and psychosocial support from like-
minded (or, at least, open-minded) colleagues,
supportive friends and family, and, to an
amazing extent, from respondents and AIDS-
community members, whose ability to relate to
my interpretations validates my work in ways
both different, and, on a fundamental level, more
important than, collegial understanding.
Standpoint thus becomes intrinsically ethical; its
recognition is a precondition of our sensitivity to
our potential for evoking oppressive social
authority vis-a-vis disempowered respondents.
By definition, when we concur as sociologists
that persons are uneyual In power and
autonomy, and that perspective participates in
situation9, we are admitting that there can be no
objective perspective. Furthermore, citing
MacKinnon:
"... objectivity - the nonsituated,
universal standpoint, whether
claimed or aspired to - is a denial
of the existence or potency of ..
inequality that tacitly
participates in constructi ng real ity
from the dominant point of view.
Objectivity, as the
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epistemological stance of which
objectification is the social
process, creates the reality it
apprehends by defining as
knowledge the reality it creates
through its way of apprehending
it.... The solipsism of this
approach does not undercut its
sincerity, but it is interest that
precedes method" (1991, p. 181;
my emphasis)
Another important element within feminist
analyses of experience is the unavoidability of
dialectic: oppositions, tensions, dilemmas and
discontinuities form part of women's lived
reality as 'Other' in a patriarchy (Westkott,
1979). By extension, some elements of this
dialectic - and some unique facets of social
reality - form part of any minority's lived
experience in a society dominated by healthy
white male perceptions, authority and vision:
"The category of the Other is as
primordial as consciousness itself.
In the most primitive societies, .
. . , one finds the expression of
duality -- that of the Self and the
Other ...
We find in consciousness itself a
fundamental hostility toward
every other consciousness; the
subject ... sets himself up as the
essential, as opposed to the other,
the inessential, the object.
....... No subject will readily
volunteer to become the object,
the inessential; it is not the Other
who, in defining himself as the
Other, establishes the One. The
Other is posed as such by the
One in defining himself as the
One" . (de Beauvoir, 1952:xvii-
xviii; my emphasis»
By extension, whether one is 'Self or 'Other'
has unavoidable consequences for standpoint.
My being a 40-year old white French-Canadian
who has been 'Other' as a woman, a member of
an ethnic and linguistic minority in her country,
a visible minority while living in Harlem (New
York), a member of the academy, and currently
an 'alienlO, in the United States, contributes to
my very particular standpoint - my having and
being a 'Self' - in ways I cannot detail ... but
must acknowledge and account for, if I am to
understand the perspective of respondents.
concur with Abraham that" [e ]xperiences happen
to individuals and therefore sometimes are to be
regarded as idiosyncratic; but these very same
occurrences might, under other circumstances,
be usefully regarded as typical" (1986, p.49).
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These arguments contest the euro-, ando- and
health-centric properties of traditional
sociological practices, which subdue the lived
actualities of people's experience to the
discourses of ruling (Smith, 1990), alienating
and occluding the experiential standpoints of the
vulnerable and the oppressed, and replacing
them by interpretations in support of the status
quo. The practice of sociology as a purportedly
objective, scienti fic enterprise sel f-perpetuates
disengaged, insensitive and often ethically
questionable research. By neglecting standpoint,
researchers diminish the urgencies - and
undermine the decision-making processes - of
those whose very lives are grist for their mills.
From this perspective, it follows that all
research unavoidably implies standpoint.
Consequently, political undertones shape
underlying theory, selection of methods, the
nature and wording of questions, the perception
of meaningful data on which the focus of
analysis hinges, . .. Thus, standpoint
challenges objectivity claims: "research is
plagued with all the emotionality and uncertainty
of any human behavior" (Ronai, 1992, p. 103).
Every researcher alters 'absolute or objective'
traits of the data through reflection and
contemplation, analysis and authorship, layering
and restructuring, emotion and ideation. Ethics
unavoidably overlay these occurrences
whether the researcher articulates ethical
principles implicitly or explicitly, appropriately
or not.
Empirical Manifestations
Implementing Advocacy
Research
Queries about my research usually seek to know
who? why? and how? My commitment to the
area started nine years ago, so 'who' has
changed over the years, and the 'why' is altered
by imperatives of participants and place.
Because as a Canadian, I consider health care a
fundamental right, and disease the ultimate
definer of one's disempowerment in a society
that so casually denies access to it, I have
chosen - and continue to choose - research
of Standpoint:
in HIV/AIDS
participants who reside in the inner-city, whose
resources are sorely depleted.
In part, this is a conscious decision to provide
an ear to people who cannot afford to 'rent'
onell. Because I believe in Civil Rights first,
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my commitment in the U.S. is to work among
socioeconomically deprived minority persons in
particular.
The 'how' is in line with these two breaches of
objectivity: I try to provide a context within
which matters relevant in some way to the
research area and important to respondents can
be voiced. I listen to people's stories, no matter
how well or badly they fit any preexisting
theory ... because few of the theories to date
are about real, everyday life in the inner-city
(Dalton, 1992). I meet people at times and
places of their choice. .. including squatter
basement apartments and shooting galleries as
well as hospital rooms and renovated
townhouses. First, I do this because I am well
aware of my dependency upon respondents, and
of the unlikeliness of my providing them with
tangible benefits in compensation for
participation. Therefore, I must minimize
inconvenience. Secondly, I also know that the
choice of place is often a test of my
commitment: I do not expect respondents to
trust me unless I show in some ways that I am
trustworthy.
The Pandora's box effect, which I define as the
negative emotional, psychological or
interactional consequences of participating in
research requesting the sharing of intimate
information without providing suitable outlets, is
always a preeminent concern. ensure the
accessibility of a therapist, nurse, social worker
or other mental health worker during the
interviews. Respondents have my telephone
numbers and are encouraged to contact me both
during the course of the research and
subsequently. In my experience, most
respondents elect to remain in touch. These
occurrences cause me to question the
effectiveness of mechanisms when researchers
only ensure access to support during the
research process. know the difficulties of
being 'on call,' .. but, through my
respondents, I know the hell of living with
HIV /AIDS. My understanding of ethics includes
obligations to remaining available after asking
di fficult questions about Ii fe-wrenchi ng
experiences. Those whose goal-orientation
inhibits this approach might note that, from a
scientific perspective, this allows ongoing
exposure to respondents' changing social reality.
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Drawing Out Inferences: Conclusion
Researchers shape knowledge and central tenets
of science recognize that knowledge is power:
neither contention is controversial. Why, then,
do social scientists limit this awareness to
discussions about the power elements of
relationships between persons and social
authorities/structures? Arguing in favor of
knowledge for knowledge's sake - the very
argument used to shore up commitments to
absolutist positions about the non suppression of
findings - is only authentic when we allow the
importance of knowledge as power for the Vel"y
persons who make that knowledge possible!
If (1) researchers owe their most significant debt
to vulnerable respondents; (2) social scientists
shape knowledge; and (3) knowledge is power,
an obvious conclusion follows: researchers owe
knowledge primarily to those who lack power
and yet, who made the research possible. Those
are the people who have most to gain from
empowerment -- and yet, who are paradoxically
thought of as 'subjects.' Any manifestation of
the Pandora's Box Syndrome mOl"ally aCCl"Ues
to the researchel' both as an individual and as
a member of a profession. My response is to
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My epistemological position - which I hope the
self-evidently problematic data I shared help
explain - is that my first obligation is to the
respondents who allow me into their lives.
Because consent is ephemeral at best, and
volatile in times of stress, I define it narrowly.
Unless respondents specifically permit the
management of findings in ways that may place
them at political risks, I do not take those risks
on their behalf.
adopt the clinical commitment to non-
maleficence, although neither my profession nor
the laws of the land recognize it as a viable
commitment for a social scientist.
Boorse and Sorensen argue that "Ducking
Harm" is, at best, cause for skepticism
concerning the ethics of the duck (1988, pp. 77-
91, in Fischer and Rav izza, 1991) . . .
reminding us that "certainty, intent and motive
are relevant" in any assessment of the morality
of behavior. Obviously, we need to distinguish
between professional codes as mechanisms of
professional self-policing, and philosophically
grounded ethics as principle-driven sets of moral
obligations (Frankena, 1973)12. Too often, the
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former are worded - or, equally importantly,
interpreted - so as to selVe merely as apologia
for researcher 'autonomy.' While the ethical
standards applied in professional codes are sets
of normative rules, their grounding selVes far
broader interests than the notion of 'ethics as
morality' (Serafini, 1989). Professional codes
are too often rooted in self-promotion and
concerns with potential lawsuits.
When this leads to realistic appraisals of risks
and the resulting adoption of respondent- and
self-oriented protection mechanisms such as
professional liability insurance, awareness of
risks is no doubt helpful. The situation is much
different when researcher self-protection receives
greater prominence than the welfare of
powerless respondents (unlikely to retaliate if we
should conduct ourselves inappropriately, since
they neither read professional journals, nor know
what constitutes 'appropriate' academic
research!).
Clearly, the decisions I take are mine; I alone
bear responsibility for them. Just as clearly,
colleagues who decide to ignore the social
context of information release must he prepared
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for the different consequences of their actions.
Is my strategy acceptable? To me, it obviously
is - although more than one colleague equates it
with suppression. Who should decide? Does
motivation count?
As an ethnographer collecting all her own data,
I can accurately anticipate findings before
completing the analysis. I have no statistical
hiding places. I know the trends as respondents
formulate them. Must I stop research when I
become aware of tendencies to behavior a
particular administration seeks to criminalize?
Am I a political hired gun, ferreting out the
information governing officials want just so they
can punish those who consent to trust me? Am
I entitled to decide what poses significant social
risk? to weigh my obligations to respondents
against my responsibilities as a member of
society? Is it sufficient to assess consequences in
light of context and circumstances, against a
backdrop of commitments to research
participants? was trained to assume
responsibility as an ethnographer for the well-
being of all those involved in my work:
respondents first, other researchers second,
society next, and my own well-being and that of
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the discipline last. Are there compelling
professional reasons to alter these priorities?
Caught between the politics of AIDS and the
welfare of both individual respondents and the
population to which they belong, can I ever
hope to find a 'neutral corner?'
NOTES
1. The language in this article was carefully
chosen. While I understand the etiology of the
term 'research subject,' I refuse to use it, and
discourage students from the practice. I fear
that we underplay the importance of the words
fueling our thinking about persons who let us into
their lives, and that this allows us in subtle
ways to objectliy them.
2. While true in its most important constituent
parts (including the dialogue), this scenario
represents a collage of circumstances, physical
and environmental attributes, all of which have
been linked with this research at different points
in time. The respondent· s name is of course
fictional.
3. See two recent edited volumes [Berg and Kenwyn
(1991) and Ellis and Flaherty (1992») for insights
into empathy as a research tool. Taylor (1991)
provides a brilliant articulation of the
importance of authenticity in every endeavor, and
more particularly in attempts at creativity.
4. Lowest Publishable units allow researchers to
generate literally dozens of "peer-refereed
articles" from a single research project, by
devoting their attention to the data, piecemeal.
AIDS research has been particularly (though by no
means exclusively) vulnerable to that approach.
The emphasis is on each variable, which becomes
the subtitle for its own artic le. The sense of
perspective, the over arching scheme of the project
is forever lost. But the resumes look good!
5. As of this writing, a court order temporarily
inhibits enforcement of the Michigan law banning
assisting anyone committing suicide. Defined as
a "break" for Dr. Kevorkian, this decision may
have consequences that are difficult to
anticipate. Despite the ultra-conservative
tendencies of the Governor, the Michigan
electorate has been repeatedly found to agree that
Dr. Kevorkian ought to be allowed to help patients
who wish to die.
6. Sources have asked to remain anonymous.
However, four current or past chairs of HSIRB's at
various universities have concurred.
Interestingly, each one is a social scientist.
Philosophers in similar positions have expressed
strenuous disagreement.
7. This problem recurs throughout the sciences.
The number of scientists who have been found to
have committed ethical faux pas only to be
rewarded with early tenure and promotion for their
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academic productivity is amply documented
(Tourigny, 1992).. and suggest to all of us who
worry about respondent welfare that we have a
long, uphill struggle ahead!
8. The opportunity to teach Ethical and
Philosophical Foundations in Research at the
Graduate level certainly confirmed the widespread
failure of social scientists to articulate their
own ethical voices as a component of writing about
research. Graduate students seeking models found
them almost exclusively in Feminist Epistemology,
although other areas - such as the undercover
investigation of crimes - cried out for similar
detailing of ethical underpinnings.
9. Much of the work of sociology lies in
explaining how "perspective" (identified as
poverty, minority status, education, race,
ethnicity, age, etc., etc.) alters life chances.
Therefore, a sociologist who denies the importance
of standpoint needs to recognize the severity of
the challenge to the very discipline this
"objective" view is intended to serve!
10. This charming term is a very politically
telling statement about the formal consideration
received by those born outside this country. This
is one more reminder of the ways in which labels
can - and do - serve to keep us aware of our power
vis-a-vis another!
11. Recently, a fifteen year old daughter whose
mother is dying of AIDS, sister of two healthy
siblings and two with AIDS phoned me, asking to
help her find someone who could help her cope. I
tried to accelerate the process to find her a
psychoanalyst, a social worker, a psychiatric
nurse, or anyone else. Four months later, she is
still on a waiting list: she is part of a
population which officially does not exist: the
daughter of someone with HIV/AIDS. She is also
part of a population many wish would not exist:
the poor-poor, African-American, inner-city
resident. the ones about which a police
officer told me " .. with any luck, they're all
killing each other off. "
12. Each of the four principles of ethics
autonomy, beneficence, justice, and non-
maleficence warrants consideration for
inclusion in every research design. I contend
that autonomy as understood in the current
conceptualization of informed consent can only be
maintained if political risks are clearly
articulated to respondents. Further, non-
maleficence, requiring that we "first do no harm"
is currently inferred by vulnerable respondents,
and that this is promoted by researchers seeking
high response rates. Justice, stipulating that
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people who are equal in all relevant respects
ought to be treated equally, while those who
differ in said respects should be treated
differently, conflicts at least potentially with
the suppression rules. Lastly, beneficence, or
the commitment to removing existing harm, cannot
be considered as a potential guiding principle
when the requirement of non-suppression governs a
research-oriented profession.
 ho a  e  i  l r vant pects 
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